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1 Introduction
The Economist recently touted (with caution) Twitter as an e¤ective mechanism for government
transparency1. However, some skepticism must be preserved, as a confounding motive behind
Twitter adoption is that of government outreach. As Felten (2009) concisely states: "outreach
means government telling us what it wants us to hear; transparency means giving us the information
that we, the citizens, want to get." Our paper attempts to tease out these two motives using a
simple cost-benet trade-o¤ that underlies the adoption decisions2 of those in the 111th House of
Representatives.
Our work complements a recent paper by Golbeck, Grimes and Rogers (2010), who explicitly
codify a subset of Twitter posts among members of congress. They nd that a majority of posts
(53 percent) provide a fact, opinion, link to article, position on article or resource. While this result
is interesting, it does not resolve the debate as to whether Twitter is being used for outreach or
transparency reasons. It is not obvious that information revelation is used exclusively to portray
honesty, or push some agenda.
We use unique hand-collected data on the Twitter adoption decisions of members in the 111th
House of Representatives. Ultimately, the study nds that a representatives propensity to adopt
increases with the number bills he/she sponsored, which we argue is a proxy for the perceived
benet associated with government outreach through Twitter. When we look closer at the adoption
decisions across parties, we nd that the amount of support (from the 2008 election) matters for
Democrats, while the number of bills sponsored matters for Republicans. We take this general
nding as suggesting that Democrats and Republicans benet from Twitter in di¤erent ways. A
bolder claim from our study says that Democrats care about transparency, while Republicans care
about outreach.
2 Research framework
2.1 Data
Our cross-sectional sample of observations consists of all active congressmen and women of the
111th House of Representatives. To obtain detailed controls about each representative, we use a
combination of the information provided on their own personal websites, the Biographical Directory
of the United States Congress. Using these sources of information, we can nd out how long each
1See the article Sweet to Tweet. The Economist, May 8, 2010.
2The framework used here is similar to that of Forman, Goldfarb and Greenstein (2005), who investigate the
relationship between location and internet adoption.
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representative has been in o¢ ce, incumbency status, the state and district he/she represents, how
old they are, their gender, race, religion, education and previous occupation before serving the
public. We augment this information with data from the 2000 U.S. Census for the districts that
they represent, such as the population, median income and race distribution of their corresponding
districts.
For each representative, we are able to identify whether they use Facebook, Flickr, MySpace,
RSS, Twitter and/or Youtube3. We rst consult each representatives URL to see whether they
are on Twitter or not4. However, some representatives do not reveal this information on their
website. Therefore, to get a complete set of Twitter users in the 111th House of Representa-
tives, we also consult aggregating sites such as http://www.congressional140.com/tweeting.php or
http://tweetcongress.org/list. An online search is also conducted to identify some Twitter account
holders who are not listed on these sites5.
The data also contains information about which committee(s) each representative belongs to.
On average, each representative belongs to two committees. A representatives underlying interests
and experience are major determinants as to which committees he/she will end up in. Moreover,
each committee is chaired by a Democrat and has a ranked Republican member. Committees consist
of disproportionately more Democrats than Republicans, so as to reect the current proportion of
Democrats in the House of Representatives. Finally, there are a total of 23 committees, each with
a specic mandate and jurisdiction, that a representative can potentially be a member of.
From the Clerk for the House of Representatives, we obtain information about each represen-
tatives percentage of votes in the most recent 2008 election, as well as the number of bills that the
representative has sponsored during the 111th session.
2.2 Empirical methodology
When each representative has to make a decision as to adopt Twitter or not, costs and benet must
be weighed. We will observe a representative adopting Twitter if and only if the net benet, benet
minus cost, exceeds zero. It is natural to consider a simple probit model of adoption, where the
latent utility is equal to the net benet and some idiosyncratic noise. We now argue that certain
variables in our data can be used to proxy for the latent utility, either through benet or cost.
3All of this information was collected on the same day.
4We are also able to identify when they adopted Twitter by observing the date of their rst Twitter post.
5Some care is taken in this procedure, as searches occasionally generated potentially fake Twitter accounts under
the name of certain representatives. To avoid this dubious information, we only consider those representatives who
have veried Twitter accounts.
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2.2.1 Perceived benet of adoption
We stipulate that the main factors in the perceived benets of Twitter adoption are peer e¤ects,
outreach and/or transparency. Peer e¤ects can increase the benet of adopting Twitter, either
through network or learning channels. As more of a representatives peers are also Twitter users,
the utility associated with adopting Twitter also increases, as Twitter allows users to interact
with one another through user-to-user replies. Alternatively, the amount of adoption among peers
may yield a favorable signal about uncertain merit regarding Twitters e¤ectiveness as a political
marketing tool. The amount of peer adoption is measured by the percentage of peer adopters,
where peers are dened by social networks formed by common committees that representatives
belong in6.
Transparency is meant to keep each representative honest. Voters will reward those politicians
they deem as being the most trustworthy. A representative who won the most recent election by a
large margin has only a valuable reputation to lose. Therefore, Twitter gives each representative
a public venue to share intimidate details about daily activities. A politician who has strong
constituent support has an incentive to stay connected with his/her followers so as to maintain
transparency. In this case, the percentage of votes from the 2008 election serves as a proxy for the
strength of constituent support.
Alternatively, government outreach allows a politician to control the information that is released
to his/her constituents. To some extent, a politicians brand can be protected or augmented through
outreach. A member of congress who has sponsored a large number of bills will have a greater
incentive to use Twitter as a way to push his/her political agenda by feeding the public mediated
information. Reaching the public in this "grass-roots" manner may be especially important when
the representative needs public support for his/her policy initiatives. Therefore, we use the number
of sponsored bills during the 111th session as a proxy for the benet associated with outreach.
6 In a similar manner as Cohen and Malloy (2010), to avoid identication of peer e¤ects o¤ of social network size,
we dene
percentage_same_party_adoptersi =
number_same_party_adoptersi
number_same_party_peersi
where number_same_party_adoptersi is a count of the number of same party adopters in the same committees as
i, while number_same_party_peersi is a count of the number of same party members in the same committees as
i. To control for exogenous committee characteristics, we also include
percentage_same_party_peersi =
number_same_party_peersi
number_peersi
where number_peersi is the size of is committee social network.
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2.2.2 Perceived cost of adoption
As with the adoption of any technology, there are adoption costs. These costs, however, may be
lower for representatives with prior knowledge or experience about social media; in particular, if
they have had experience with similar social media outlets such as Facebook, Flickr, MySpace,
RSS and/or Youtube. Given the close similarities between Facebook and Twitter, our prior is that
Facebook serves as the best proxy for social media familiarity.
The use of Twitter is not free of opportunity costs, as posting Twitter messages uses up a
representatives own time, or his/her sta¤er resources. Their opportunity cost should especially
large if they belong to a number of committees. Time spent away from committee duties can have
serious consequences on important policy decisions, especially so if a representative is a committee
chair.
3 Results
Our results suggest that Twitter adoption is driven by both cost and benet considerations. The
proxies for MySpace, RSS, Flickr, Facebook and Youtube adoption have positive e¤ects on the
adoption of Twitter, especially so for Facebook. This result supports our hypothesis that those
politicians who are tech-savvy face lower adoption costs than those who are not. Members of
congress who belong to a large number of committees and/or are committee chairs are less likely
to adopt Twitter, which suggests an opportunity cost associated with Twitter use.
A major benet associated with Twitter is driven by peer e¤ects7. The percentage of own
party adopters within a committee network has a marginal e¤ect of 1.02 (0.35). Using the entire
sample, we nd that the number of bills has a positive and signicant inuence on the propensity to
adopt, while the percentage of 2008 votes does not matter. At rst glance, this result suggests that
outreach outweighs transparency when representatives formulate the benets of adopting Twitter.
However, if we repeat the cost-benet analysis across party lines, we get a rather di¤erent picture.
The marginal e¤ect8 of the percentage of votes in 2008 is 0.58 (0.27) for Democrats, while it is
0.17 (0.48) for Republicans. This result supports the conjecture that the benet associated with
communicating with ones own constituents is largest for Democrats. Outreach serves as a more
important benet to Republicans, as the marginal e¤ect associated with the number of bills is 0.01
(0.0044) as opposed to 0.003 (0.0024) for Democrats. Furthermore, we see that the marginal e¤ect
7Peer e¤ects may materilize through network or learning e¤ects. Investigating this further is beyond the scope of
this paper.
8Standard errors in parenthesis.
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of the percentage of own party adopters within a committee network is 1.17 (0.52) for Republicans,
and 1.50 (0.77) for Democrats, which suggests that peer e¤ects impact adoption decisions across
party lines.
A large concentration of Twitter adoption occurred around January 2009, which is the time in
which a number of new sta¤ers began to work for the representatives. This exogenous event may
bias our estimates for the bills e¤ect upwards, as the sta¤ers likely assist in both the initiation of
bills, as well as activity on Twitter. We attempt to control for this event by repeating the probit
estimations, except omitting those representatives who adopted Twitter 100 days before or after
January 20, 2009. Even after controlling for this event, the e¤ect that the number of bills has on
the rate of adoption is still signicant, and especially so for Republicans.
A natural follow up question: how does the benet associated with outreach accrue? We demon-
strate that, at least for Republicans, the rate of adoption is higher if a representative has sponsored
a large number of bills and belongs to committees with a large proportion of Democratic Twitter
adopters9. The benet associated with outreach is substantial if Twitter can be used to garner
public support for certain policies, which in turn, generates support from political rivals. This
benet should be especially pronounced if a large percentage of rivals are also Twitter users, who
consequently are more likely pay attention to peersTwitter activity.
4 Summary
Our study uncovers heterogeneity in the benets of Twitter adoption across political parties, which
leads us to conclude that transparency matters for Democrats, while outreach matters for Republi-
cans. We later show that the perceived benet of outreach is related to the impact it could have in
inuencing political rivals who are also on Twitter. In general, this paper provide additional insight
into the recent popular culture debate about Twitters relevance in e¤ective government communi-
cation, using a standard economic model of innovation adoption along with unique hand-collected
data.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Twitter adoption 0.418 0.494 0 1 438
log(Population) 13.364 0.214 10.96 15.2 438
log(Income) 10.643 0.262 9.620 11.43 438
Percentage black 12.637 15.963 0 96.400 438
Gender 0.167 0.373 0 1 438
Black 0.082 0.275 0 1 438
Catholic 0.292 0.455 0 1 438
Law 0.352 0.478 0 1 438
Ivy league school 0.098 0.298 0 1 438
Age 57.333 10.16 28 86 438
Incumbent 0.861 0.347 0 1 438
Tenure 9.550 8.711 0 54 438
Democrat 0.598 0.491 0 1 438
Party votes 0.516 0.1 0 0.96 432
Representative votes 0.656 0.125 0.27 1 427
Number of committees 1.936 0.826 0 4 438
MySpace 0.014 0.116 0 1 438
RSS 0.573 0.495 0 1 438
Flickr 0.151 0.358 0 1 438
Facebook 0.571 0.496 0 1 438
Youtube 0.731 0.444 0 1 438
Bills 18.018 12.45 0 96 438
Chair 0.103 0.304 0 1 438
Percentage same party adopters 0.403 0.182 0 0.889 438
Percentage other party adopters 0.461 0.189 0 0.889 438
Percentage same party peers 0.512 0.148 0 1 438
Percentage other party peers 0.459 0.142 0 0.697 438
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Table 2: Baseline probit regression results. Column (1) contains the full set of observation. Column
(2) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Democratic party, while column
(3) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Republican party.
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Democrat Republican
log(Population) 0.372 (1.593) 2.420 (2.546) -3.065 (2.181)
log(Income) 0.171 (0.314) 0.722 (0.454) -0.503 (0.535)
Percentage black 0.00491 (0.00557) -0.00201 (0.00762) 0.0250 (0.0142)
Gender 0.165 (0.178) -0.0762 (0.233) 0.904 (0.394)
Black -0.582 (0.342) -0.370 (0.421)
Catholic 0.0492 (0.161) 0.0703 (0.209) -0.255 (0.293)
Law -0.0613 (0.149) 0.0511 (0.206) -0.218 (0.238)
Ivy league school 0.383 (0.227) 0.465 (0.263) 0.549 (0.527)
Age -0.0120 (0.00821) -0.00288 (0.0111) -0.0229 (0.0154)
Incumbent -0.376 (0.234) -0.355 (0.305) -0.561 (0.434)
Tenure -0.00910 (0.0115) -0.0112 (0.0139) -0.00549 (0.0206)
Democrat -0.474 (0.549)
Party votes -0.0695 (0.688) -0.498 (0.904) -1.409 (1.337)
Representative votes 1.236 (0.657) 1.869 (0.863) 0.444 (1.285)
Number of committees -0.132 (0.104) -0.0628 (0.159) -0.168 (0.156)
MySpace 1.099 (0.726) -0.316 (0.661)
RSS 0.264 (0.146) 0.466 (0.196) -0.0834 (0.241)
Flickr 0.407 (0.187) 0.237 (0.258) 0.579 (0.295)
Facebook 0.709 (0.154) 0.929 (0.214) 0.521 (0.257)
Youtube 0.0744 (0.183) 0.102 (0.236) 0.273 (0.351)
Bills 0.0144 (0.00577) 0.00926 (0.00775) 0.0281 (0.0118)
Chair -0.186 (0.246) -0.177 (0.360) -0.128 (0.356)
Percentage same party adopters 2.625 (0.907) 4.831 (2.473) 3.124 (1.398)
Percentage other party adopters 0.762 (0.695) 0.112 (1.227) 1.078 (1.497)
Percentage same party peers -1.465 (0.822) -2.099 (1.128) -4.358 (3.719)
Percentage other party peers -1.925 (1.096) -1.625 (2.113) -0.980 (1.801)
Constant -6.981 (21.42) -41.65 (34.44) 48.22 (30.21)
Observations 427 249 175
McFadden R2 0.222 0.192 0.206
BIC 616.6 380.0 315.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 3: Probit regression results using a sub-sample of representatives who did not adopt Twitter
in December 2008, January 2009 and February 2009. Column (1) contains the full set of observation.
Column (2) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Democratic party, while
column (3) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Republican party.
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Democrat Republican
log(Population) 0.674 (2.159) 3.417 (2.826) -7.397 (4.261)
log(Income) 0.0263 (0.357) 0.320 (0.523) -0.756 (0.842)
Percentage black 0.00511 (0.00651) -0.000963 (0.00831) 0.0273 (0.0153)
Gender 0.312 (0.215) 0.101 (0.268) 1.319 (0.596)
Black -0.506 (0.400) -0.261 (0.474)
Catholic 0.137 (0.189) 0.259 (0.240) 0.0991 (0.471)
Law -0.167 (0.176) 0.0237 (0.232) -0.918 (0.365)
Ivy league school 0.421 (0.269) 0.478 (0.308) 1.339 (0.757)
Age -0.0136 (0.00945) -0.0107 (0.0128) -0.0118 (0.0190)
Incumbent -0.452 (0.290) -0.400 (0.356) -0.965 (0.608)
Tenure 0.00363 (0.0131) 0.00348 (0.0165) 0.0228 (0.0274)
Democrat -0.596 (0.619)
Party votes -0.327 (0.810) -0.258 (1.230) -2.384 (2.164)
Representative votes 1.081 (0.788) 1.475 (0.982) 1.371 (1.838)
Number of committees -0.0968 (0.119) -0.0177 (0.178) 0.0581 (0.226)
MySpace 0.899 (0.859) -0.108 (0.775)
RSS 0.302 (0.171) 0.414 (0.218) 0.233 (0.391)
Flickr 0.488 (0.223) 0.429 (0.288) 0.454 (0.629)
Facebook 0.712 (0.190) 0.921 (0.267) 1.257 (0.448)
Youtube 0.0536 (0.215) 0.138 (0.273) -0.487 (0.511)
Bills 0.0188 (0.00659) 0.0111 (0.00900) 0.0546 (0.0161)
Chair -0.279 (0.260) -0.245 (0.390) -0.0502 (0.481)
Percentage same party adopters 2.083 (1.095) 6.137 (2.796) 2.465 (2.054)
Percentage other party adopters 0.848 (0.766) -0.0149 (1.333) 0.938 (2.193)
Percentage same party peers -1.387 (0.899) -2.762 (1.298) -6.956 (5.098)
Percentage other party peers -1.865 (1.305) -1.676 (2.309) 0.349 (2.434)
Constant -9.549 (29.22) -50.69 (38.19) 107.1 (59.19)
Observations 341 221 99
McFadden R2 0.196 0.204 0.295
BIC 482.0 310.6 200.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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Table 4: Probit regressions with interactions. Column (1) contains the full set of observation.
Column (2) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Democratic party,
while column (3) uses only the subset of representatives who are members of the Republican party.
(1) (2) (3)
Full sample Democrat Republican
log(Population) 0.358 (1.592) 2.426 (2.541) -2.839 (2.163)
log(Income) 0.165 (0.314) 0.717 (0.454) -0.521 (0.532)
Percentage black 0.00491 (0.00555) -0.00193 (0.00762) 0.0204 (0.0141)
Gender 0.170 (0.179) -0.0732 (0.234) 0.787 (0.388)
Black -0.565 (0.341) -0.362 (0.419)
Catholic 0.0488 (0.161) 0.0711 (0.209) -0.237 (0.301)
Law -0.0606 (0.149) 0.0528 (0.205) -0.217 (0.240)
Ivy league school 0.375 (0.227) 0.458 (0.265) 0.506 (0.528)
Age -0.0121 (0.00823) -0.00296 (0.0112) -0.0206 (0.0158)
Incumbent -0.379 (0.234) -0.358 (0.305) -0.538 (0.437)
Tenure -0.00895 (0.0115) -0.0110 (0.0140) -0.0126 (0.0209)
Democrat -0.518 (0.557)
Party votes -0.0443 (0.691) -0.488 (0.904) -1.567 (1.335)
Representative votes 1.244 (0.656) 1.874 (0.860) 0.389 (1.347)
Number of committees -0.131 (0.103) -0.0624 (0.159) -0.209 (0.158)
MySpace 1.088 (0.723) -0.205 (0.666)
RSS 0.261 (0.147) 0.465 (0.196) -0.0972 (0.241)
Flickr 0.405 (0.187) 0.241 (0.258) 0.604 (0.292)
Facebook 0.712 (0.155) 0.927 (0.214) 0.473 (0.259)
Youtube 0.0768 (0.183) 0.104 (0.237) 0.215 (0.355)
Bills 0.0194 (0.0140) 0.0138 (0.0236) -0.0891 (0.0643)
Chair -0.187 (0.246) -0.188 (0.366) -0.0949 (0.363)
Percentage same party adopters 2.564 (0.917) 4.827 (2.474) 2.736 (1.444)
Percentage other party adopters 0.979 (0.899) 0.275 (1.443) -3.349 (2.999)
Percentage same party peers -1.425 (0.822) -2.076 (1.130) -3.171 (3.754)
Percentage other party peers -1.922 (1.096) -1.599 (2.110) -1.504 (1.800)
Bills * Percentage other party adopters -0.0103 (0.0270) -0.00782 (0.0386) 0.418 (0.222)
Constant -6.804 (21.40) -41.80 (34.40) 46.91 (29.82)
Observations 427 249 175
McFadden R2 0.222 0.192 0.220
BIC 622.5 385.5 317.4
Robust standard errors in parentheses
p < 0:05, p < 0:01, p < 0:001
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